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In the debate on monetary policy strategies on both sides of the Atlantic, it is now almost a 
commonplace to contrast the Fed and the ECB by pointing out the former’s flexibility and 
capacity to adjust rigidity, and the latter’s extreme caution, and obsession with low inflation. In 
looking at the foundations of the two banks’ strategies, however, we do not find differences that 
can provide a simple explanation for their divergent behavior, nor for the very different 
economic performance in the U.S. and Euroland in recent years. Not surprisingly, both central 
banks share the same conviction that money is neutral in the long period, and even their short-
term policies are based on similar fundamental principles. The two policy approaches really 
differ only in terms of implementation, timing, competence, etc., but not in terms of the 
underlying theoretical orientation. We then draw the conclusion that monetary policy cannot 
represent a significant variable in the explanation of the different economic performances of 
Euroland and U.S. The two economic areas’ differences must be explained by considering other 
factors among which the most important is fiscal policy. 
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THE NEW MONETARY CONSENSUS 
 
Orthodox economists have embraced a “new monetary consensus” (NMC) to monetary theory and 
policy formation. In this section we very briefly set out the key characteristics of this consensus. In 
later sections, we will show how the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Fed have adapted the 
NMC to develop their own approaches to policy formation. 
  The NMC is based on an adaptation of the Taylor Rule, easily summarized in simple three 
equation models. There are several versions, but perhaps the best-known has an equation for 
output gap (the percentage point gap between actual and potential output), a dynamic version of a 
Philips curve relating inflation to the output gap, and a monetary policy (Taylor-like) rule. These 
can be set out as 
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where Y
* is the output gap, R is the nominal interest rate target, r
* is the “natural” or equilibrium 
real interest rate, p is inflation, α represents weights (backward and forward looking inflation 
formation), and p
* is the inflation target (ε and ξ are stochastic shocks) (Meyer 2001). Note that the 
nominal interest rate target is set taking into account the output gap and the difference between 
actual and desired inflation. This then feeds into the IS-like demand gap equation based on the 
presumption that the nominal rate less expected inflation influences demand. 
Very briefly, there is a general consensus among respectable economists that, in the long 
run, only the supply side matters. In the short run, both supply side and demand side variables 
matter. Unlike the 1960s version of Keynesian economics, fiscal policy is given a small role to 
play on the demand side (although government can influence the supply side, for example through 
its tax policy). Hence, monetary policy is given the larger role to play in impacting demand and 
growth. In the long run, money is neutral, but a variety of transmission avenues have been posited 
to allow money to influence demand in the short run. The new consensus rejects a simple 
monetarist transmission mechanism (from monetary aggregates to spending). Rather, it is 
recognized that central banks operate mostly with interest rate targets, but these are supposed to 
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affect demand directly (interest elasticity of spending) and indirectly (portfolio effects). Thus, 
there is substantial consensus that the central bank has a strong, albeit short run, impact on 
demand. When the economy grows too fast, threatening to set off inflation, the central bank is to 
dampen demand by raising interest rates; when it grows too slowly (causing unemployment and 
raising the specter of deflation), the central bank lowers rates to stimulate demand. 
 
THE FED: APPLICATION OF THE NEW MONETARY CONSENSUS 
 
In this section, we examine the theory that currently guides monetary policy making in the U.S. 
Here we focus on the Fed’s actual policies and statements, as well as upon transcripts of its secret 
discussions at FOMC meetings. We will make the case that the Fed has formulated a particular 
procedure that is loosely based on the new monetary consensus, and that it began implementing 





4  inflation as the only official goal 
5  neutral rate as the policy instrument to achieve these goals 
 
Before proceeding we provide a summary. Over the past decade the Fed has increased 
transparency, both by telegraphing its planned moves well in advance of policy changes and also 
by announcing interest rate targets. It has also followed a course of gradualism, taking the form of 
very small adjustments of interest rates (usually 25 to 50 basis points) spread out over periods as 
long as two or even three years to achieve its ultimate interest rate targets. Ironically, the 
combination of openness and gradualism can force the central bank to make policy moves at the 
wrong time in order to fulfill market expectations that it has created. 
These developments have occurred during a long-term trend toward increased monetary 
policy activism, which contrasts markedly with Milton Friedman’s famous call for rules rather than 
discretion. The policy instrument used by the Fed is something called a neutral rate that varies 
across countries and through time. This neutral rate cannot be recognized until it is achieved, so it 
cannot be announced in advance—which is somewhat in conflict with the Fed’s adoption of 
increased transparency. As Friedman long ago warned, an activist policy has just as much chance 
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of destabilizing the economy as it does to stabilize the economy—matters are made even worse 
when activist policy is guided by invisible neutral rates and fickle market expectations that are 
largely fueled by the Fed’s own public musings. Finally, we challenge the Fed’s frequent claim 
that its only concern is inflation. Actually the Fed does target asset prices and income shares, and it 
shows a strong bias against labor and wages even as its attitude toward profits inflation is benign. 
 
The Quest for the Elusive “Neutral Rate” 
Most explications of the NMC include an “equilibrium” or “neutral” real interest rate, that is the 
rate that is consistent with elimination of the output gap in the set of equations above. After the 
monetarist policy experiment of the early 1980s in the U.S., U.K., and elsewhere, during which 
money growth targets were supposed to bring down inflation, central bankers struggled to find an 
acceptable alternative. For a time in the U.S., after completely abandoning any sort of reserve or 
money target, the Fed toyed with a variety of indicators or targets for monetary policy formation.
1 
By the mid 1990s, various Fed officials agreed with Governor Lindsey when he said: “we look at a 
whole raft of variables—we ignore nothing and we focus on nothing;” or with Governor LaWare 
who said simply “I get a feel for what I think is going on” (Papadimitriou and Wray 1994). The 
general tone of policy formation was likened to “reading tea leaves,” or aptly characterized by 
Keith Bradsher (1994) when he wrote that “policy formation has become more intuitive.” 
However, as the transcripts of Fed deliberations make clear, behind closed doors the Fed 
began discussing a “neutral interest rate” as a possible target in 1994. At the March 22, 1994 
meeting, many argued that while there still was no evidence of rising inflation, short term interest 
rates were overly accommodative and well below a “neutral” rate. President Jordan admitted that 
“I don’t know where neutral is” but “I feel very strongly that we are nowhere near a neutral stance 
and that we ought to be aggressive in moving toward it.” (FOMC 1994b, p. 49). Since the latest 
rate hike, the Fed has again been trumpeting the neutral rate as an indicator for policy formation.
 
However, while economists outside the Fed are willing to put a number on the neutral rate (rates 
anywhere from 3.5 to 5 are quoted in the press), the Fed prefers to remain circumspect, simply 
saying that it is the interest rate that neither provokes inflation nor slows down the economy. 
According to Chairman Greenspan, “You can tell whether you’re below or above, but until you’re 
                                                 
1 “Real interest rate,” price indices, “P-star,” surveys of expected inflation, gold prices, and Taylor rules. 
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there, you’re not quite sure you are there. And we know at this stage, at one and a quarter percent 
federal funds rate, that we are below neutral. When we arrive at neutral, we will know it.” 
(Andrews 2004). 
In reality, a neutral rate cannot be temporally or spatially fixed. For four years the U.S. had 
an overnight rate at one percent, without sustaining robust growth or setting off significant 
inflation. In 2004 the Fed began raising rates even with no labor market pressure, on the argument 
that the neutral rate was far above the then current rate—indicating the neutral rate had somehow 
shifted upward. Japan has had a near-zero overnight rate target for a decade without inducing 
recovery—meaning that its neutral rate must be far into negative territory. If the neutral rate varies 
through time and across nations, presumably with the state of the economy, and if policymakers 
cannot know what it is ahead of time—recognizing it only once it is achieved—it cannot provide 
useful guidance. Rather, the Fed must focus on current and projected economic growth and 
inflation data. 
 
Transparency, Gradualism, and Policy Activism  
Transparency. Just as we can trace the Fed’s adoption of a “neutral” rate to the early 1990s, the 
other components of the Fed’s version of the NMC can also be found in deliberations around its 
rate hike of 1994. Recall that FOMC deliberations at that time were highly secretive and that rate 
hikes were disguised in coded releases that referred to decisions to “increase slightly the degree of 
pressure on reserve positions.” It was left to markets to try to figure out the rate target. Led by 
Representative Gonzalez, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, there was pressure on the 
Fed for greater transparency (FOMC 1993, Appendix). This came to a head as Greenspan made 
less than forthright statements about the existence of detailed records of transcripts of FOMC 
meetings. As it happened, written records of all FOMC deliberations had been kept, and pressure 
was applied for their release. This led to an interesting debate within the Fed about the political 
and economic consequences of greater transparency, eventually leading to the agreement to release 
transcripts and other materials associated with FOMC meetings after a five year lag. And, of 
course, the Fed now not only warns that rates “must rise at some point” in advance of its decisions, 
but it also announces precisely what its target Fed funds rate is. Hence, transparency has increased 
greatly over the past decade and has become an obvious feature of the Fed’s policy. Indeed, the 
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Fed is seen as much more transparent than its counterpart, the ECB (see, e.g., Blinder (2004, pp. 5-
33)). 
 
Activism. Why was it so critical to take action to raise the rate target in early February 1994? We 
now know that the Clinton expansion really would not get underway for another two years, and 
that it continued for another six years with no pick-up of inflation and with unemployment rates 
eventually dropping far below any NAIRU estimates. Indeed, at the later May 17, 1994 meeting, 
Governor Jordan argued that “where we are is not that we are entering the fourth year of the 
expansion, but rather that we are someplace in the first year of a classic expansion” (FOMC 1994c, 
p. 23)—in other words, the FOMC knew it had raised rates at the very beginning of expansion! 
Why, then, raise rates in February, and continue to raise them over the next year by a total of 300 
basis points? The answer was articulated by a number of FOMC participants: to enhance the Fed’s 
credibility as an inflation-fighter.
2 The earlier the Fed moves to “preempt” inflation, the greater its 
inflation-fighting credibility! An active Fed is a credible Fed. 
 
Gradualism. After the February rate increase, financial markets stumbled. Chairman Greenspan 
noted that the Committee had held “expectations that we would prick the bubble in the equity 
markets” with the February hike and while he favored getting “policy to neutrality as fast as we 
can,” he didn’t believe “the financial system can take a very large increase without a break in its 
tensile strength—which we strained significantly the last time but did not break” (FOMC 1994b, p. 
43). Hence, he favored a gradual series of small rate hikes, to get the Fed funds rate to the 4 – 4 ½ 
% range. If the market came to expect 25 basis point hikes at each subsequent FOMC meeting 
until “neutrality” was achieved, this would “break the bubble” in equity markets while still 
“restoring confidence in the System.” (FOMC 1994b, p. 44) We see the justification for 
gradualism in the fear that large rate hikes have too big of an impact on financial markets. The 
combination of gradualism and transparency would help to prepare financial markets to avoid the 
                                                 
2 Governor Broaddus: “I really think the System’s anti-inflationary stance has done a great deal to increase 
our credibility in recent years” (FOMC 1994a, p. 23); Vice Chairman McDonough: “A 25 basis point 
move…would send the right signal in the sense that the Federal Reserve, the central bank, is being 
watchful, as it should be. And we would be moving earlier in the economic cycle than the Fed has done 
historically and, therefore, we are doing our job even better than in the past.” (FOMC 1994a, p. 46); 
Governor Forrestal: “I think we will gain credibility by moving now even though there might be some 
marginal risk that we might have to reverse course.” (FOMC 1994a, p. 49). 
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types of crashes the Fed had produced in the stock market decline of 1987 and the bond market 
collapse of 1994. However, it is notable that the Fed’s attempt to “prick the bubble” back in 1994, 
as well as Greenspan’s statements two years later about “irrational exuberance” only caused 
temporary setbacks for the developing euphoria that would play out over the rest of the decade, 
and then come to a crashing end when the Fed raised interest rates just as the economy headed into 
recession at the end of the decade. Further, the most recent rate hikes have not succeeded in 
cooling the real estate bubble in the U.S.—indeed, after mortgage rates temporarily rose, they 
actually have dropped back near to the lows they had reached before the Fed began raising rates. 
 
Dirty Little Distributional Secrets At The Fed? 
The Fed would like to be perceived to be “above the fray,” making policy decisions free from 
political decisions in a dispassionate quest to wring inflation from the economy. To that end, the 
Fed would like to stay out of debates about employment as well as income distribution and, more 
specifically, about differential impacts of rate changes on different groups. Chairman Greenspan 
and other Fed officials have argued that it is nigh well impossible to determine whether a housing 
market bubble currently exists, and are loathe to be seen as attempting to burst real estate markets 
through the recent rate hikes. Thus, the Fed continually denies it targets asset prices. 
However, we know from the transcripts that the Fed was, indeed, consciously trying to 
“prick” what it perceived to be an equity price bubble as early as 1994. Many believe that the rate 
hikes that began in 2004 were designed to slow real estate speculation, in spite of the Fed’s 
frequent claims that bubbles are impossible to identify. Finally, it is abundantly clear that the Fed 
continually guards against wage-driven inflation, raising rates even before labor markets tighten, 
but it openly accepts profits-driven inflation. Indeed, during early 2004 the Fed refused to raise 
rates even as profits boomed, arguing profits inflation would be self-limiting—while it implicitly 
adopts the position that wages inflation is not. This represents a clear bias against labor in favor of 
entrepreneurs (Wray 2004). 
 
Consensus 
The term “consensus” is important to NMC in two different ways. First, NMC represents a 
theoretical “consensus” accepted by most mainstream academic and policy-making economists 
about the way in which monetary policy affects the economy. In addition, application of the NMC 
  6 
to policy-making also relies on the development of a “consensus” of expectations. It is believed 
that while monetary policy is neutral in the long run, in the short run it can have large, uncertain, 
and potentially destabilizing effects. For this reason, the central bank needs to work with the 
private sector to clearly communicate its policies and ultimate goals—hence, the need for 
transparency and for gradualism. Effectively, the Fed develops consistent expectations that it will 
always be on guard against inflation, that it will prepare markets well in advance of any policy 
moves, that any rate changes will be small and gradually implemented, and that it will “stay the 
course” once it embarks on a policy—unless economic conditions change considerably. In this 
way, even if money and interest rates have uncertain effects (perhaps because of long and variable 
lags), the monetary policy consensus helps markets to behave as if the economy were not 
uncertain. 
 
Critique of Fed Policy 
The Fed cannot help but notice that interest rate changes do have distributional impacts. Rate 
changes, and anticipations of rate changes, can have large and disruptive impacts on financial 
markets. As we have seen, part of the justification for gradualism and telegraphic statements of 
intentions is the necessity to “prepare” financial markets. In addition, rate hikes mostly work on 
the “real economy” through different interest rate elasticities and spending propensities. There is 
little evidence that business investment (or most other private sector spending) is highly interest-
sensitive, as rate changes are easily swamped by other effects, such as profitability considerations. 
In the consumer sector, households are net interest recipients, so if spending propensities were 
homogenous, permanent rate hikes should stimulate consumption spending by raising interest 
income—and this could potentially offset the negative interest elasticities. However, interest 
income is very unequally distributed, and it is likely that spending propensities of interest 
recipients are different from those who do not receive net interest income—although there is little 
work that would enable us to say with confidence what that variance is. Further, and this is 
important, the federal government is a very large net payer of interest to the private sector, so rate 
hikes increase budget deficits and hence stimulate private spending—again, to a degree that has 
not yet been reliably estimated. 
From this, we can conclude that if interest rates matter, they work largely through 
distributional channels, but these are complex and little studied. Almost all empirical work focuses 
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on interest rate elasticities of private sector spending (and, notably, no reputable study has ever 
found much elasticity there), ignoring distributional effects. It is conceivable that distributional 
effects all “wash out” so that interest rate policy has the conventional signs—rate increases lower 
spending—but we really do not know. In any case, the dirty little secret cannot be denied that there 
are distributional effects, and that the Fed does consider these in its meetings (Wray 2004). And as 
discussed, there does seem to be something of an asymmetric bias toward profit income and 
against wage income, and toward net interest recipients and against net debtors, because the Fed 
raises interest rates at the first hint that labor markets are recovering, and at a pace that financial 
markets can “handle” so that net creditors will receive the interest due. 
“Keynesian” economics has always been skeptical of the central bank’s ability to “fine-
tune” the economy, in spite of the long-running Monetarist claims about the efficacy of monetary 
policy (even if orthodox wisdom following Friedmanian dictates used to disdain discretion). The 
canonization of Chairman Greenspan over the past decade and a half has eliminated most orthodox 
squeamishness about a discretionary Fed, while currently fashionable theory based on the “new 
monetary consensus” has pushed monetary policy front and center. As John Kenneth Galbraith 
recently argued, lack of empirical support for such beliefs has not dampened enthusiasm. Like 
Galbraith, the followers of Keynes have always insisted that “[b]usiness firms borrow when they 
can make money and not because interest rates are low” (Galbraith 2004, p. 45). 
Finally, the Fed appears to be aware that its adoption of transparency and gradualism 
means that it surrenders a degree of discretion to market expectations. Policy makers must 
continually gauge the pulse of the market to ensure that these expectations are not disappointed. As 
the Minutes of the 30 June 2004 meeting make clear, the FOMC’s decision to raise rates was based 
largely on the market’s expectation that rates would be raised. The minutes comment that the May 
decision to leave rates unchanged was “fully anticipated” by markets, but that after May, markets 
expected a rate hike, an expectation the Fed felt compelled to oblige. In his testimony of 
September 8, 2004 before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, the 
Chairman admitted that “inflation and inflation expectations have eased in recent months” as the 
economy “hit a soft patch” and “employment gains moderated notably.” Still, the Chairman and 
the Fed raised rates a third time on September 21 to keep pace with the expectations of rate hikes 
the FOMC had succeeded in generating through its public pronouncements of the “inevitability”  
of rate hikes. The rate hikes continued through 2005, even after Katrina. Like a cat chasing its tail, 
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the Fed will continue to follow expectations upward as it pushes rates to the four or four-and-a-half 
percent range the market has come to expect as “inevitable,” and that the Fed believes to represent 
a “neutral rate.”  
Because these rate hikes are fully incorporated within expectations, they have almost no 
discernible impact on market behavior. This is the problem with the creation of a consensus of 
expectations: small rate hikes have almost no impact, but large rate changes are ruled out of 
bounds by consensus policy formation. As Wojnilower recently put it, the Fed always seems to be 
 
apologizing for previous actions that had upset the financial markets, and 
promising the markets not to repeat them. But by tying their own hands this way, 
the authorities also deprived monetary policy of its effectiveness—until, 
inevitably, the time recurred when, with no other way to gain the market’s 
attention and modify its behavior, officials had to resort to different surprising and 
disturbing measures. (Wojnilower 2005) 
 
Wojnilower is justly famous for arguing that “[t]he impact of changes in long-term rates of 
interest, while greater than of short-term rates, is limited,” hence “non-interest limits to credit 
growth are normally necessary to abort (or prevent) runaway expansions” (Wojnilower 2005); see 
also Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). Because NMC policy formation as practiced in the 
U.S. shuns large rate changes and because there is no role for direct credit controls, monetary 
policy is impotent. As Wojnilower concludes, “[a]ll the Fed is accomplishing by its routine short-
rate increases is to habituate the market and the public to ignore its actions…. Credit must be 
widely unavailable at any price for monetary policy to bite…. The main question as regards the 
next Fed chairperson is not his insight into current economic statistics, or whether he is a ‘hawk’ or 
‘dove’ on inflation. Rather it is whether he recognizes that the principal raison d’etre of central 
banks…is to safeguard the monetary and financial system” (Wojnilower 2005). 
 
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
 
The ECB is a much younger institution than the Federal Reserve; it was established in June 1998 
and took full responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy only in January 1999. The creation 
of the ECB, and especially the adoption of the euro, was an important step in the attempt to 
promote economic and monetary integration among European countries. The ECB’s monetary 
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policy strategy has some features that seem to be inspired by the NMC, but it also presents some 
peculiarities as it maintains a rather strong link with monetary targeting. We first outline the 
bank’s strategy and leave critical considerations to a following section. Unfortunately, we are not 
able to provide as much detail on the inner-workings of the ECB as its deliberations are not as 
transparent as those of the Fed. 
 
The Foundations of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy 
The fundamental principle that guides the ECB’s strategy has not changed to any significant extent 
since its birth in 1998-99. It hinges on the basic conviction that money is neutral in the long run, a 
key component of the NMC. When all adjustments in the economy have occurred, changes in the 
quantity of money only determine the general price level. In this context, the fundamental task of 
the ECB is to guarantee price stability, even though it should also take account of the broader goals 
of the European Community (output, employment, etc.), provided that they are compatible with 
price stability: “given that monetary policy can affect real activity in the shorter term, the ECB 
typically should avoid generating excessive fluctuations in output and employment if this is in line 
with the pursuit of its primary objective.” (ECB 2004, p. 44). 
In the long run, money can only influence the general price level, but this does not mean 
that inflation (or deflation) is seen as “neutral” by the ECB. Inflation is harmful to the economy, 
whereas price stability is beneficial in several respects. The ECB maintains the following: 
1.  If the general price level is stable, agents find it easier to distinguish changes in the general 
price level from changes in relative prices and thus can behave “more rationally.” 
2.  Stable prices reduce, or eliminate altogether, the risk premium that lenders attach to their 
lending. 
3.  Stable prices do not induce agents to divert resources from productive uses to hedge against 
inflation. 
4.  Taxes and the welfare system can distort economic behavior; inflation can exacerbate such 
distortions. 
5.  Inflation is a tax on cash holdings; therefore when inflation is high households reduce their 
demand for cash and transaction costs rise. 
6.  Price stability prevents arbitrary wealth and income redistribution. 
 
Thus, rather than taking direct responsibility for elimination of any output gap, the ECB 
purports to provide an environment in which the economy can “naturally” close the gap—and that 
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is done mostly through maintaining inflation near to 2% annually. The transmission mechanism 
from policy to prices requires a considerable span of time to play out. Moreover, the process is 
highly uncertain, because of shocks from many different sources. As a consequence, “Monetary 
policy (…) needs not only to monitor the transmission of monetary policy changes but also to take 
into account all other developments relevant for future inflation in order to avoid these having any 
impact on longer-term inflation trends and expectations in a way that is inconsistent with price 
stability” (ECB 2004, p. 47). 
From all this, the crucial importance of expectations follows. According to the ECB, its 
policy is more effective if inflation expectations are “firmly” anchored. In this framework, the first 
element of the bank’s strategy is a quantitative definition of price stability. Since 2003, the ECB 
adopts the following definition of price stability: inflation is “below but close to 2% over the 
medium term” (ECB 2004, p. 51).
3 The reasons for defining a precise inflation target and making it 
public are: it makes the policy easy to understand; it is a clear benchmark against which the ECB’s 
policy can be evaluated by the economy; and it provides a reliable guide to the formation of 
consistent expectations. Thus, adoption of a target helps to build a consensus of expectations. 
The ECB’s operations for achieving price stability are based on the so-called “two pillars”: 
1) “assessing the short to medium-term determinants of price developments, with a focus on real 
activity and financial conditions in the economy” (economic analysis); 2) focusing “on a longer-
term horizon, exploiting the long-run link between money and prices” (monetary analysis) (ECB 
2004, p. 55). The ECB’s document (ECB 2004, p. 56) points out that a policy that targets money 
aggregates relies on the idea that there is a stable relationship between the quantity of money and 
the price level in the medium term and on the conviction that the central bank can control the 
money supply over short periods of time. The ECB does not criticize such hypotheses and argues 
that it did not adopt the monetary growth rule because it thinks that there is also information other 
than money that is relevant for policy decisions. Similarly, the ECB decided not to adopt strict 
price targets because, in its view, this is too mechanical and, like the monetary rule, does not take 
into consideration other relevant variables. More precisely, a certain forecast inflation rate “does 
                                                 
3 Initially, the ECB defined price stability as a yearly increase in the harmonized index of consumer prices 
(HICP) below 2%. It is evident that such a definition is largely unsatisfactory: “below 2%” can mean 
anything, even a negative rate of inflation. Galí and others (2004) see this change of definition possibly as a 
“preparatory move before an eventual increase in the target inflation rate.” 
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not provide an encompassing and reliable framework for identifying the nature of threats to price 
stability. The appropriate monetary policy response generally depends on the sources of these risks 
to price stability.” Finally, the ECB document regards the “exchange rate targeting” strategy as 
inappropriate for Euroland, a large and relatively closed economy. 
 
The Conduct of Monetary Policy: 1999-2005 
Policy measures taken by the ECB have been dominated by its preoccupation with inflation. Even 
in the most recent years, when the bank lowered its key interest rates to help Euroland out of 
stagnation, caution has been dominant. The ECB takes pride in the fact that inflation was kept at 
low levels and, therefore, considers its first five years of activity a success. In its view, despite 
several shocks that hit Euroland during this period, it realized the medium-term target of price 
stability. In fact, from January 1999 to December 2004, the inflation rate has remained 
substantially near to the 2% target, remaining most of the time below 2.5%, with a rise during the 
period April-June 2001 when inflation reached 3.1%. 
The ECB’s conduct of monetary policy can be divided into three phases: between the 
beginning of 1999 to November of the same year; November 1999 to May 2001; and May 2001 to 
the present. At the beginning of 1999, the bank saw “increased downward risks to price stability” 
in Euroland, so that, in April, it reduced the fixed rate on main refinancing to 2.5%.
4 However, in 
the summer of the same year, it perceived growing inflationary pressures. Thus, in November the 
rate on main refinancing returned to 3% (its initial value in January 1999). This was the beginning 
of a rather long period of increasing interest rates. The rate of main refinancing was progressively 
raised, up to its peak of 4.75% from October 2000 to May 10 2001.
5 On May 11, for the first time 
the rate was reduced by 25 basis points. After that, there were further reductions and the rate 
reached a minimum of 2% in June 2003. The rate is still at 2% in September 2005. 
                                                 
4 Main refinancing operations are open market interventions in which the ECB lends in the form of reverse 
transactions, i.e. the bank buys assets under a repurchase agreement or it lends against a collateral (ECB 
2004, p. 74). Main refinancing operations can take place through fixed or variable rate tenders. From 1999 
to June 2000, the ECB implemented its tenders at a fixed rate; from June 27, 2000 onward, the bank 
implements its tenders at a variable rate. This change was aimed to avoid cases of overbidding; but the 
variable rate tenders have given rise to cases of underbidding. As a consequence, in 2003-04, the ECB has 
introduced some further changes to its operational framework. For more details on the ECB’s operational 
framework see ECB (2004, pp. 71-90; 2005). 
5 Over the period, the rate on main refinancing experienced an increase of 225 basis points. 
  12 
From January to November 1999, the inflation rate had averaged 1.1%; after the ECB’s 
intervention following its concern about inflationary pressures, the inflation rate was not only 
higher but kept rising to reach its peak in May 2001 (3.1%). During the whole period of increasing 
interest rates, the inflation rate averaged 2.1%. In the following phase of declining interest rates, 
the average inflation rate has been 2.2% (see table below). 
 
Critiques of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy 
Like many critics, Bibow (2005) questions the ECB’s ability to guarantee low inflation and, at the 
same time, he points out that the bank’s strategy may have favored slow growth in Euroland. Some 
similar critiques can be found in Wyplosz (2000), who sees the ECB’s anti-inflationary policy as 
successful but also points out that at such low inflation rates negative effects on the level of 
employment may prevail. Fontana, Sawyer, and Arestis have also criticized the ECB along similar 
lines. 
The most crucial problem with the ECB’s strategy is represented by its choice to ground it 
on the two pillars. In evaluating and comparing its strategy with other approaches, the ECB 
acknowledges similarities and points of contact both with “monetary targeting” and “inflation 
targeting,” but these two different strategies are incompatible with one another and, we argue, are 
not achievable, anyway. The basic principle on which the ECB’s monetary analysis is grounded is 
a rather crude form of the quantity theory applied to the medium-long run (ECB 2004, boxes 3.6-
3.7, pp. 63-4). At the same time, despite the attempts to differentiate from it, fixing an inflation 
target close to 2% is very similar to “inflation targeting” strategies. In fact, the ECB’s criticisms of 
inflation targeting do not appear too convincing.
6 While one may agree with the observation that a 
single inflation forecast does not provide a sound framework for policy formation, it is not clear 
why the ECB’s target of “inflation close to 2%” is a better tool.
7 Secondly, as argued by Mishkin 
(2004, pp.122-3), direct inflation targeting need not be based on a fixed, and more or less arbitrary, 
                                                 
6 The bank criticizes inflation targeting for being too mechanical  (ECB 2004: 56). In the ECB’s view, the 
sources of inflationary pressures can be varied and they can be understood only through a deeper analysis of 
the economy than that associated with an inflation forecast alone. Another criticism is that the single 
inflation target cannot embody other information contained in monetary aggregates. Finally, for the ECB, to 
rely on a single forecast is said to be “unwise” in the context of Euroland, which is characterized by a 
differentiated economic structure. 
7 Moreover, it is peculiar that the ECB’s justifications for adopting the “2% target” are very similar to those 
given in favor of direct inflation targeting; see, e.g., Mishkin (2004, pp. 120-1). 
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time horizon. The ECB’s criticism of inflation targeting that it cannot embody all the information 
contained in monetary aggregates, is evidently related to its ambiguity concerning the control of 
money supply. The European central bank still believes that, at least in the medium-long term, 
monetary policy can be conducted by controlling M3.
8 
It is not surprising that some prominent exponents of the NMC have criticized the ECB’s 
strategy. According to the NMC, monetary policy works through real interest rates and 
expectations, not through money aggregates. Galí and others (2004) examine the ECB’s 
justifications for taking account of monetary growth and conclude that monetary analysis plays too 
prominent a role in the bank’s strategy.
9 In truth, a central bank has no direct control over 
monetary aggregates, and all modern central banks actually operate with overnight interest rate 
targets. But also the ability of central banks to affect output inflation through manipulation of the 
interest rate target is highly doubtful. As discussed above, interest rates must operate through 
spending elasticities and distribution—and these may move in opposite directions–at least some of 
the time. In any case, the evidence is at best mixed. 
In the next section we compare U.S. and Euroland economic performance and ask whether 
Fed and ECB policies have been sufficiently divergent to explain the differences in performance. 
We will conclude that the fiscal policy constraints in Euroland play a much more significant role in 
explaining the differential performance. 
 
EUROPEAN AND THE U.S. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES: 1999-2004 
 
If monetary policy is indeed the driving factor behind economic performance, and if U.S. and 
Euroland economic performance is substantially different, then we should be able to observe 
substantially different monetary policy. The basic indicators of economic performance in the table 
below leave little doubt about relatively poorer economic performance in Euroland. 
                                                 
8 Much more cogent criticisms of inflation targeting and good reasons why the Fed should not follow such 
strategy have been provided by Benjamin Friedman. In particular, Friedman holds that focusing on an 
inflation target would imply a further atrophying of the central banks’ concern for other objectives than 
price stability (Friedman 2004, pp. 135-6). The tendency to “atrophy” pointed out by Friedman, however, is 
coherent with the hypothesis of money neutrality. 
9 Even though they acknowledge that the strategy underwent an evolution that led to downplaying the 
importance of monetary policy. Initially, monetary analysis was the first pillar; it became the second in 
2003. 
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The economic performance of the U.S. and Euroland, 1999-2004 
  
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices, annual 
percent change 
Inflation, annual percent 
change 
Unemployment rate 
   USA Euroland USA Euroland USA  Euroland 
1999 4.4 2.7 2.2 1.1 4.2 9.2
2000 3.7 3.8 3.4 2.1 4 8.2
2001 0.8 1.7 2.8 2.3 4.8 7.9
2002 1.6 0.9 1.6 2.3 5.8 8.3
2003 2.7 0.7 2.3 2.1 6 8.7
2004 4.2 2 2.7 2.1 5.5 8.9
Source: IMF 
 
After the relatively high rates of growth of 1999-2000, Euroland GDP grew at very low 
rates while the rate of unemployment remained always close to 8.5-9%. Inflation in the U.S. was 
somewhat higher than in Europe, but GDP grew much faster and unemployment was at record low 
levels—averaging little more than half of Euroland levels. Can the different conduct of monetary 
policy in the two areas provide an explanation of such differences? Our answer is “obviously not,” 
as the comparison of official interest rates below shows that the rate differences between USA and 
Euroland are too small to explain these differences. 





















Over the period January 1999 to August 2005, the U.S. nominal rates were, on average, 
higher than in Europe and with a much larger variability. Still, U.S. growth was higher, inflation 
was only slightly higher, and unemployment was significantly lower—none of which is strictly 
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consistent with NMC wisdom. If it is real rates, rather than nominal rates, that matter, we are still 
unable to give a satisfactory account of the differences. Between 1999 and 2004, the U.S. average 
real rate was lower than the European by only 40 basis points, whereas the difference between 
their GDP growth rates was almost 100 basis points. Further, it is hard to explain why greater 
variance of nominal interest rates should lead to better economic performance. Low variance of 
rates and a firmer commitment to a firmer inflation goal in Euroland should have led to better 
economic performance. Finally, the differential between U.S. and Euroland interest rates—whether 
measured in nominal or inflation-adjusted terms—are far too small to explain relative demand gaps 
(if unemployment rates are indicative of such gaps). 
Even if monetary policy does not diverge that much between the U.S. and Euroland, fiscal 
policy is quite different. In the U.S., federal government spending averages near 20% of GDP, 
with spending net of taxes swinging by nearly 7% of GDP from the Clinton-era peak budget 
surplus to the Bush recession peak deficit. In Euroland, the equivalent to federal government 
spending by the European Parliament amounts to about 1% of Euroland GDP. Most government 
spending in Euroland is decentralized to member states and their subordinate governments. It is 
true that these are large relative to their national output and that some of them run deficits above 
3% of GDP whereas no U.S. state budget is so large relative to state output, and no U.S. state has 
issued debt nearly so large relative to state GDP as that of the typical Euroland member state. 
However, all U.S. states can rely on huge fiscal transfers from Washington if necessary, as the 
recent experience with hurricane Katrina has shown. Early estimates are that the federal 
government will spend an amount equal to one or two percent of national GDP this year and next 
in New Orleans; it is hard to imagine that Euroland would be able to achieve such a feat to rescue a 
member state. 
There is an additional consideration that follows on from the construction of the EU. 
Because fiscal policy is constrained, unlike the U.S., the EU relies on foreign demand as an engine 
of economic growth. While the U.S. current account deficit has risen fairly steadily and now 
approaches 6.5% of GDP, total Euroland net exports as a percent of Euroland GDP averaged 
1.65% between 1999-2004. This creates a circularity because each member state tries to increase 
net exports—both with other EU nations and with the rest of the world—in part by trying to 
become a low-cost producer. As exchange rates are fixed with the rest of the EU and in any case 
are outside the control of any member nation, the only alternative is to maintain or reduce wages 
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and prices within the member state. This adds more pressure for fiscal austerity and slow growth. 
Budget deficits are largely “endogenously” determined by economic performance, hence, the large 
deficits in some member states were not discretionarily chosen but rather resulted from the high 
unemployment that has hit nations like Germany, Italy, and France. 
Many point to the Stability and Growth Pact as the constraint on member state budget 
deficits. Although the larger nations have ignored it when the constraints did not suit them, the 
constraints do seem to have been selectively imposed on smaller nations. In addition, there can be 
little doubt that new and prospective members have imposed fiscal restraint on their economies as 
a condition of joining the EU, and it is highly probable that many member state policymakers have 
become more “fiscally responsible” because of perceived budget constraints. However, markets 
can also impose constraints on member state budget deficits. In the U.S., debt ratings fall and 
interest costs rise quickly whenever bond raters downgrade a state or local government’s debt 
because it exceeds what is deemed to be fiscally prudent spending levels. But this is quite in 
contrast to the market’s treatment of sovereign (national) debt. While it is true that markets have at 
times downgraded sovereign debt (as in Japan in recent years), the rating agencies make it clear 
that they recognize there is no solvency problem entailed in sovereign budget deficits. Hence, the 
downgrading is attributed to “country risk,” which is basically determined by the markets’ 
perception of a country’s situation—but this has little impact on sovereign interest rates. 
Government debt issued by Euro nations is already perceived to be heterogeneous by 
markets; as Kelton (2003) has shown, interest rates have actually diverged since monetary union, 
rather than converging as was expected by orthodox economists. Markets seem to have recognized 
that Euronations have relinquished some of their sovereignty—and become more like U.S. states. 
Markets must increasingly weigh the risk of default by individual member states, as well as the 
probability of a bail-out by the EU. However, unlike the case in the U.S. the procedure to be used 
to bailout a member state is not well-defined. The ECB is practically prohibited from bailing out 
member states, and although it is impossible to say what it might do in a crisis there is enough 
uncertainty about this to create the possibility of a run out of a member’s debt. Further, as already 
discussed, there is no central fiscal authority with anything like the responsibility of the U.S. 
Treasury. Charles Goodhart has summarized the problem as follows: 
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The federal institutions in the EU have neither the ability, nor the wish, to 
guarantee the deficits of the subsidiary state governments. The ECB is 
admonished not to support failing State governments, and there is no fiscal 
competence at the federal level either to make inter-regional transfers in response 
to asymmetric shocks or to support the ECB in meeting the burden of bailing out 
a State government. So the federal government in the EU neither can, nor wants 
to, carry out its part in the kind of implicit bargains observed in other federal 
systems. (Goodhart 2005, pp. 21-2) 
 
Even if it is nearly impossible to imagine the failure of Germany occasioned by a market 
run out of its IOUs, one cannot be sure of a concerted EU attempt to resolve a financial crisis in 
one of the smaller or newer Euro nations. It is conceivable that the problem could begin with 
private financial institutions and spread to a member state’s government liabilities; if the ECB 
refused to intervene as lender of last resort, the panic could spread to other member states. 
As Goodhart has suggested, it really is this fiscal angle that poses the real problem for the 
sustainability of the unification of Europe. To be sure, monetary policy might have been managed 
better and consistently lower interest rates might have encouraged more growth. On the other 
hand, it is hard to see why the Fed’s policy over the past decade should be considered to have been 
substantially superior to that of the ECB, or in any case to have been the primary cause of the 
better economic performance in the U.S. We believe that fiscal policy constraints in Euroland have 
already led to unacceptably lower growth and higher unemployment, and the current fiscal 
arrangements carry the possibility of a catastrophic financial crisis. Although there is no way to 
know, it is possible that more expansionary fiscal policy might have led to faster economic growth 
and lower unemployment, but without larger fiscal deficits. Hence, the Euroland experience seems 
to diverge from U.S. experience because of differences in fiscal policy—which also implies that 
the NMC rejection of the efficacy of fiscal policy is in error. While it is beyond the scope of this 
article, we would suggest that reform would include creation of a mechanism for lender of last 
resort activity by the ECB (as Wojnilower’s comment suggests) as well as for large and perhaps 
automatic countercyclical fiscal transfers from a central fiscal authority to member states.
10 These 
reforms would be a step in the right direction. 
                                                 
10 Kregel (1999) has proposed an employer of last resort program for Euroland, financed from the center, as 
a means to reduce employment and at the same time provide an automatic stabilizing fiscal transfer. 
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